The continuous-time version of Kyle's (1985) model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is studied, and generalized in various directions, i.e., by allowing time-varying noise trading, and by allowing the orders of the noise traders to be correlated with the insider's signal. From rather simple assumptions we are able to derive the optimal trade for an insider; the trading intensity satisfies a deterministic integral equation, given perfect inside information.
Introduction
We take as our starting point the seminal paper of Kyle (1985) , where a model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is presented. Traders submit order quantities to risk-neutral market makers, who set prices competitively by taking the opposite position to clear the market. Excluding the market makers, the model has two kinds of traders: a single risk neutral informed trader and noise traders. The informed trader rationally anticipates the effects of his orders on the price, i.e., he acts non-competitively or strategically. In the presence of noise traders it is impossible for the market makers to exactly invert the price and infer the informed trader's signal. Thus markets are semi-strong, but not strong form efficient.
In this model the insider makes positive profits in equilibrium by exploiting his monopoly power optimally in a dynamic context. Noise trading provides camouflage which conceals his trading from market makers. An important issue is to demonstrate that this is possible in equilibrium without destabilizing prices.
Kyle's approach is to first study a one-period auction, then extend the analysis to a model in with auctions take place sequentially, and finally letting the time between the auctions go to zero, in which case a limiting model of continuous trading is obtained. Back (1992) formalize and extend the continuous-time version of the Kyle model, by i.a., the use of dynamic programming.
There is a rich literature on the one period model, as well as on discrete insider trading, e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , and others, all adding insights to this class of problems. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) present a different approach, containing similar results to Kyle. Before Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) there is also a huge literature on insider trading in which the insider acts competitively, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . The purpose of this article is to study the continuous-time model directly, not as a limiting model of a sequence of auctions, and use certain aspects of the modern methodological machinery in continuous-time modeling to resolve the problem of the informed trader, in a more general setting with time-varying noise trading, where the orders of the noise traders are also allowed to depend upon the insider's private information. Furthermore, we do not assume that the final price p T equals the insiders signalṽ, but show that this is a consequence of our other model assumptions. The wealth of the insider can be represented as a stochastic integral of his orders with respect to the changes in the market price. This integral is not of a standard form, since the insider's order is not in the information set generated by the prices. This is precisely where a key part of the problem lies; the insider has more information then reflected in the market prices.
There is, however, an extension of the stochastic integral, called the forward integral, in which the usual information constraint of this type of analysis need not be satisfied. This is exactly what we need in the present context of asymmetric information.
The prices set by the market makers are in the form of a conditional expectation, which calls for the use of filtering theory. Combining these two methodologies, we are able to solve the insider's problem in a direct way, leading to a deterministic integral equation for the insider's trading intensity β(t) at time t, given his information set with perfect forward information.
We solve the integral equation for the trading intensity β(t) by by transforming this equation to a non-linear, separable differential equation, which calls for a simple solution. This we compare to the solution of Kyle (1985) (and also Back (1992) ). In the special case of time homogeneous noise trading, we recover the Kyle-solution. For time-varying noise trading we get the result that the market depth is still a constant, and the expected (ex ante) profits of the insider depends on the average volatility process.
The Model
At date T there is to be a public release of information that will perfectly reveal the value of an asset; cf. fair value accounting. Trading in this asset and a risk-free asset with interest rate zero is assumed to occur continuously during the interval [0, T ]. The information to be revealed at time T is represented as a signalṽ, a random variable which we interpret as the price at which the asset will trade after the release of information. This information is already possessed by a single insider at time zero. The unconditional distribution ofṽ is assumed to be normal with parameters µṽ and σṽ.
In addition to the insider, there are liquidity traders who have random, price-inelastic demands, and risk neutral market makers. All orders are market orders and the net order flow is observed by all market makers. We denote by z t the cumulative orders of liquidity traders through time t. The process z is assumed to be a Brownian motion with mean zero and variance rate σ 2 t , i.e., dz t = σ t dB t , where σ t > 0 is a deterministic continuously differentiable function on [0, T ], for a standard Brownian motion B defined on a probability space (Ω, P ). Note that we do not assume thatṽ is independent of B s ; s ≤ T . This makes it necessary to use anticipative stochastic calculus. We use forward integrals to model this situation. See (2.5) below and Appendix 1. We let x t be the cumulative orders of the informed trader, and define (2.1)
as the total orders accumulated by time t. Market makers only observe the process y, so they cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed trades. Let F y t = σ(y s ; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of this process. Since the market makers are assumed to be perfectly competitive and risk neutral, they will set the price p t at time t as follows
which we will call a rational pricing rule. We assume that the insider's portfolio is of the form
where β ≥ 0 is some deterministic function, both assumptions consistent with Kyle (1985) . 1 The function β t is the trading intensity on the information advantage (v − p t ) of the insider.
Denote the insider's wealth by w and the investment in the risk-free asset by b. The budget constraint of the insider can best be understood by considering a discrete time model. At time t the agent submits a market order x t −x t−1 and the price changes from p t−1 to p t . The order is executed at price p t , in other words, x t is submitted before p t is set by the market makers. The investment in the risk-free asset changes by b t − b t−1 = −p t (x t − x t−1 ), i.e., buying stocks leads to reduced cash with exactly the same amount. Thus, the associated change in wealth is (which was pointed out by Back (1992 
In other words, the usual accounting identity for the wealth dynamics is of the same type as in the standard price-taking model, except for one important difference; while, in the rational expectations model, the number of stocks in the risky asset at time t is depending only on the information available at this time, so that both the processes x and p are adapted processes with respect to the same filtration, here the order x depends on information available only at time T for the market makers (and the noise traders). As a consequence writing the dynamic equation for the insider' wealth as follows
x s dp s is not well defined as a stochastic integral in the traditional interpretation, since p t is F y t -adapted, and x t is not. Let us define the information filtration of the informed trader as G t = F y t ∨ σ(ṽ). Thus the informed trader knowsṽ at time zero and observes y t at each time t. Obviously the filtration G t ⊃ F y t and this extension is not of a trivial, or technical type, but a significant one. For example, there is information in G t for any t ∈ [0, T ) that will only be revealed to the market makers at the future time T . The key point here is that from (??) the order x t depends onṽ which is not in F y t . Since the insider knows the realization ofṽ at time 0, he has long-lived forward-looking information. When z is not assumed to be independent ofṽ, the extension of the ordinary stochastic integral to a semimartingale setting is not justified any longer.
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In the stochastic integral representing the budget constraints x t is G tmeasurable, and p t is F t -measurable which is the violation of the standard, important requirement of any stochastic integral in the traditional interpretation.
There is, however, a stochastic integration theory based on the so-called forward integral, which turns out to be useful under the informational asymmetry that we have. It is a natural extension of the usual stochastic integral, with the informational constraints that we require of the dynamic wealth equation based on the above budget constraints. It is denoted by (2.5)
where d − p s stands for forward integration. From its very definition, which is given by a limit (in probability) of the usual partial sums of the type appearing in (??), it follows that it will have the correct financial interpretation, 2 It does not help here to extend to a stochastic integral of a predictable process with respect to a semimartingale, as in Back (1992) . In his case this procedure was valid, since z was explicitly assumed independent ofṽ.
given that the concept is meaningful. It turns out that it is, and naturally the forward integral will not possess many of the standard properties of the stochastic integral, but there is a version of Itô's formula that still is valid, and which we need in the following (see Appendix I for a definition, Itô's formula, and references).
We can now formulate the problem: The insider wants to solve, for each time point t (2.6) max
subject to the price p satisfying the rational pricing rule (??), the insider's strategy x satisfying (??), and the dynamic forward stochastic differential
Usually the assumption is made that p T =ṽ a.s., but as we will show below, this is a consequence of our other model assumptions. This result seems natural, ensuring that all information available has been incorporated in the price at the time T of the public release of the information.
Since there is a tacit understanding that the price process p is continuous in this model, this result also means that the insider must trade continuously throughout the time interval [0, T ], and we can expect that the trading intensity β must be large as t approaches T in order for this condition to be satisfied.
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An equilibrium is a pair (p, x) such that p satisfies (??), given x, and x is an optimal trading strategy solving (??), given p. We now have the following result:
Theorem 2.1. Given the linear trading strategy (??), the optimal trading intensity β(t) is given by
The corresponding price p t set by the market makers is
dy t is a Brownian motion with respect to the market makers' information, and the price sensitivity λ t is given by
; a constant over time.
At the terminal time T the price p T corresponding to the optimal insider insider tensity β satisfies
Remark 2.2 To summarize, our paper differes from the papers of Kyle (1985) and Back (1992) both with respect to basic assumptions and method:
(i) We do not assume thatṽ is independent of {z(s); 0 ≤ s ≤ T }. Because of this, the integral in (2.5) may not exist as a semimartingale integral. Therefore we have to deal with anticipative stochastic calculus, by means of the forward integral.
(ii) We do not assume that the volatility σ(t) of the noise traders is constant. Nevertheless we prove that the price sensitivity λ t is constant also in our case, if the optimal strategy is applied.
(iii) We do not assume a priori that
But this is proved to be the case if the optimal strategy is used.
We remark that if we had made this assumption a priori, then our proof could have been simplified as follows: The last term in (4.14) would have been 0. Hence (see (4.16)) we would have S (β) t,T = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and Problem 1 would automatically reduce to Problem 2.
(iv) We do not assume a priori that the strategy x t is incospicuous, i.e. that
is a Brownian motion with respect to its own filtration. However, this is proved to hold if x t is chosen optimally.
(v) We do not assume a priori that there exists a function H such that
But this is proved to be the case if the insider acts optimally.
(vi) Finally, since we are not assuming a Markovian setup we cannot use dynamic programming (the HJB equation) to find the optimal strategy, but we use forward integrals and a perturbation argument instead.
Remark 2.3
It is interesting to note that also in our general setting the total order process y t becomes a Brownian bridge if the optimal insider strategy is used. To see this we proceed as follows: By (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) we have
Thus y t is the bridge of the process z t = t 0 σ s dB s , conditioned to arrive at the terminal value
In particular, if σ t = σ is constant we get (2.12)
and hence 1 σ dy t is the classical Brownian bridge, conditioned to arrive at
In Section 4 we present a proof of Theorem 2.1. First we discuss the properties of the solution.
3 Properties of the equilibrium.
The generalization relative to Kyle (1985) included in Theorem 2.1 allows for a time varying volatility parameter in the order process of the noise traders. One would, perhaps, expect that as a consequence the market liquidity function λ t would depend on time, suggested by the expression (4.39) in the next section. The result of Theorem 2.1 is that it does not. The intuition for this can be explained as follows:
The trading intensity β t will typically increase as t approaches T , since the insider becomes increasingly desperate to utilize his residual information advantage. In particular, from expression (??) in Theorem 2.1 we see that β t /σ 2 t increases as t increases. It follows from the proof in the next section, equations (4.38) and (4.39), that the price sensitivity λ t can be written
Here
Furthermore S t can be shown to have the form
The quantity t 0β 2 s ds measures the the "amount" of insider trading to liquidity trading by time t. As this quantity increases over time, the amount of private information S t remaining at time t is seen, from the above expression, to decrease, where S t is the (mean square) distance betweenṽ and p t . The function λ t is seen to depend on two effects: (i) The quantity β t /σ 2 t increases over time, which tends to increase λ t as time t increases.
(ii) The quantity S t decreases over time, suggesting that the insider's information advantage is deteriorating, which tends to decrease λ t as t increases. In equilibrium (i) is offset by (ii) and λ t = λ is constant over time.
Notice that the important quantities are β t /σ 2 t and β t /σ t =β t in the above arguments. The mere fact that the amount of insider trading represented by
From the expressions in Theorem 2.1 we notice that
s ds so β t is inversley related to λ for each t. Since the quantity 1/λ measures the market depth, the insider will naturally trade more intensely, ceteris paribus, when this quantity is large. From the general discussion in Kyle (1985) it is indicated that if the slope of the residual supply curve λ t ever decreases (i.e., if the market depth ever increases), then unbounded profits can be generated. This is inconsistent with an equilibrium, so λ t must be monotonically non-decreasing in any equilibrium. It is argued that this follows since in continuous time, the informed trader can act as a perfectly discriminating monopsonist, moving up or down the residual supply curve (i.e., the market is infinitely tight). Hence, he could exploit predictable shifts in the supply curve. From the analysis of Back (1992) it is known that, more generally, this slope must be a martingale given the market makers' information. Our result that λ t is indeed a constant is, accordingly, consistent with the literature.
One would, perhaps, expect that the insider, since he can be assumed to know the function σ t , may use it to further conceal his trade in that he will use a high β t at a time when σ t is large. This impression is confirmed by investigating the optimal trading intensity β appearing in expression (??) of Theorem 2.1.
However, when σ t is low the insider must apply a correspondingly lower trading intensity, and it turns out that the expected (ex ante) profits average out. This can be demonstrated as follows: Consider the expected wealth of the insider
an expression which follows from the results of the next section. Here the last term is the expected (ex ante) profits, which can be shown to be
4 Thus, trading at a time-varying volatility σ t corresponds exactly, when it comes to expected profits, to trading at a constant volatility σ determined by σ s ds is large, we noticed above that λ is small, in which case the insider's profit is large. However, a small value of λ is, in isolation, no guarantee for a large ex ante profit of the insider, since a large value of S 0 also makes the profit of the insider large, and λ large as well.
This points in one possible direction for extending the present model. Suppose that the private information is connected to quaterly accounting data for the firm, so T stands for one quarter, and let us extend the model beyond T to 2T , 3T, · · · , etc. Let us, as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), imagine two types of liquidity traders, discretionary and non-discretionary. Just after each disclosure period of length T , the level of private information relative to the uninformed is at its minimum. It seems reasonable, from the above formula for the ex ante profits of the insider, that the discretionary traders, acting strategically to time their trades, should concentrate their trade to these times in order to loose less to the insider. That this kind behavior is optimal is expected from the conclusions of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , who noticed that λ is a constant is not in accordance with empirical findings; the bid ask spread 2λ is varying over time.
We also have the following corollary: Corollary 1. Suppose σ t = σ > 0 is a constant. Then the optimal trading intensity for the insider is
The corresponding price p t set by the market makers is given by (3.2) dp t = λ t dy t , where
This result follows from Theorem 2.1 by setting σ s ≡ σ in (??). The results of Corollary 1 are in agreement with Kyle (1985) and Back (1992) (when we set T = 1).
Recently, a paper of related interest by Eide (2007) came to our knowledge. Her work, which was done independently of ours, differs from ours in several ways: She focuses on the situation when the price processṽ t of the stock is assumed to have a specific dynamics (an Itô diffusion and a martingale with respect to an independent Brownian motion), and its current valueṽ t (notṽ T ) is known to the insider at time t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. She avoids the use of forward integrals by assuming a priori that the processes are semimartingales with respect to the relevant filtrations. Like Back she then assumes that the market makers set the price equal to p t = H(t, y t ) for some function H and that H(t, y t ) = E(ṽ T |F y t ). These assumptions put the problem of finding a corresponding equilibrium into a Markovian context, which allows her to solve the problem by using dynamic programming. In conclusion, her a priori assumptions are stronger than ours, but they enable her to solve other problems than we do. In particular, the final stock valuẽ v =ṽ T need not be normally distributed in her case.
We now present the proof of Theorem 2.1. It can be noted to be rather different from the corresponding development in Kyle (1985) .
The solution of the problem
From the requirement that the market makers are able to calculate the correct conditional expectation ofṽ at all times, we are led to consider filtering theory, which involves the following system of equations:
Let Fŷ t = σ(ŷ s ; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of the processŷ. The innovation process y is defined by
Let F y t = σ(y s ; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of the process y. Then we have:
Proof. Since, by (4.3)
we see that
To prove the converse we use that by an extension of the Kalman filter we have (see Lipser and Shiryaev (1978) , Theorem 12.2) (4.6)
and (4.7)
Combining (4.6) and (4.8) with (4.4) we get
If we define
this can be written
If we multiply this equation with
1 Kt exp(−γ t ), where
we get
This can be written
Integrating this we obtain
This shows thatŷ t can be expressed in terms of y s ; s ≤ t and hence that
Combining this with (4.5) we obtain F y t = Fŷ t and the proof of Lemma 4.1 is complete.
From filtering theory we know thatỹ defined by dỹ t := 1 σt dy t is a Brownian motion with respect to the information filtration F y t .
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Using (??), (??) and the definition y = x + z, we see that what we have called the innovation process y in the above is equal to the total accumulated order process of the previous section. Returning to the equation (??), there is a analog of Itô's formula for forward integration, which says that
(see formula (??) of Appendix I). Since x has finite variation, dp t dx t = 0 and we get (4.12)
Therefore we get that
As before let (4.15)
and define
5 The result that 1 σ y is a Brownian motion with respect to the market makers' information was assumed by Back (1992) .
(Note that if we had assumed that p T =ṽ a.s. then we would get S t,T = 0 and the proof would simplify considerably.) Then (4.14) can be written
From (4.7) we see that S t satisfies the Riccati equation
By (4.6) we get that
satisfies the equation
Integrating this we get
This implies that
In particular, note that We now return to problem (2.6). By combining (4.17) and (4.7) we see that our original problem can be formulated as the following control problem:
over all β ∈ A, where A is the set of all (deterministic) functions β : [0, T ] → R which are continuously differentiable on (0, T ).
We will first study the following related problem:
We will find the optimal controlβ ∈ A for Problem 2 and show that the corresponding terminal price p T =ṽ a.s.
It follows by (4.16) that S (β)
t,T = 0 and henceβ is also optimal for Problem 1, because, sup
In view of this we now proceed to solve Problem 2. Since the map
is concave, we can use the following perturbation argument to find the maximizer for J(·):
Choose an arbitrary function ξ ∈ A and define the real function g by
Then g is maximal at y = 0 and hence
Changing the order of integration in the last term we get
Since ξ ∈ A was arbitrary, we conclude that an optimal β t must satisfy the equation
where, as before, S t is given by equation (4.7) . This is an integral equation in the unknown function β. Differentiating (??) with respect to t we get
Combining this with (4.11) we obtain
We now combine (??) and (??) to get
.
Integrating this we obtain, with c i integration constant, i = 1, 2, . . .
Then equation (??) gives the non-linear, separable differential equation
which has the general solution
Substituting (??) into the right hand side (RHS) of (??) we get Substituting this into (??) we get (4.34) 
Now recall from equation (4.7) that
By the use of (??) we find that (4.40)
In particular, (4.41) S T = 0 and hence p T =ṽ a.s.
Inserting the expression (4.40) for S t into the expression for λ t in (??), we obtain (4.42)
This solves Problem 2 and hence, in view of (4.41), also Problem 1. That completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Conclusions
Under a set of rather natural assumptions we have formulated an insider's problem as maximizing the expected value of future wealth subject to the price of the stock satisfying the rational pricing rule (??) and the strategy satisfying (??). This latter constraint seems reasonable, since from (??) we see that the insiders wealth can be written (x 0 = 0)
where the equality follows since x has finite variation. As a consequence the final net wealth equals the value of the final position less the cost of acquiring it. The cost formula is analogous to the usual one for the cost of a discriminating monopsonist. It also follows that this final wealth can be written
(assumption (4.2) on p. 1326 in Kyle (1985) ). From our assumptions we derive that the rational pricing rule has the form Kyle (1985) ). Even in the case of time-varying noise trading we obtain that the price response function λ t = λ for all t, a constant.
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We had to use an extended stochastic integral to achieve our goal, and given this new concept our approach was rather direct and gave a unique solution to the problem, provided our assumptions. Moreover, this line of attack seems like a natural framework to further investigate some of the problems underlying insider trading and differential information.
More formally, suppose x : [0, T ] → R is a measurable stochastic process adapted to the filtration G t but not necessarily to the filtration F t . The forward integral of x with respect to B t was first defined by Russo and Vallois (1993) , and was applied to insider trading, in a framework different from the one in the present paper, in Biagini and Øksendal (2005) . For our purpose, it is sufficient to consider the case when x is left continuous with right-sided limits (càglàd). Then the original definition simplifies to (??).
One can show that if x t is adapted to some filtration G t such that B t is a G t -semimartingale, then the forward integral of x coincides with the semimartingale integral of x (if it exists). See Biagini and Øksendal (2005) . Thus the forward integral is an extension of the semimartingale integral to (possibly) non-semimartingale contexts.
An Itô formula for the forward integrals was first obtained by Vallois (1995, 2000) . It may be presented as follows: Let X t = X t (ω) be a stochastic process of the form Such processes X t are called forward processes.
Theorem 5.1 (The one-dimensional Itô formula for the forward processes). Let X t be as above and let f ∈ C 1,2 (R × R) . Define
Then Y t is again a forward process and
Note the similarity between this and the classical Itô formula. We refer to Vallois (1995, 2000) for a proof.
The Itô formula extends to several dimensions, as follows:
